Infectious diseases services in the UK would not currently be able to cope with a future emergent infection on the scale of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), a UK House of Lords committee report has claimed.

The "Fighting infection" report (<http://www.parliament.thestationery-office.co.uk>) from the Select Committee on Science and Technology claims that while the UK "has not experienced major epidemics of infection in recent years, this owes as much to good fortune as to good management", and calls on UK government to make arrangements for formal collaboration and lines of accountability. Foremost among these suggestions are proposed regional "infection centres" to create a critical mass of expertise and high quality research, and to bridge existing gaps between different areas of specialty, particularly in the reporting of emerging infection. It is likely that such centres would represent a commitment to consultant expansion.

Some experts, however, are sceptical as to whether such centres, and the speed with which they are created, really would be able to maintain expertise across diverse departments or whether the move would represent merely a "breaking up" of the existing body, the Health Protection Agency (HPA). The HPA, which covers England and Wales and was put in place in April this year, evolved from the Public Health Laboratory Service. Maria Zambon (HPA, London, UK) voices a common concern that, "whilst \[the creation of a new agency\] does offer many opportunities to create new structures and improve control of infectious disease in the UK, there is a significant risk that triedand-tested structures that work well may be at risk through changing personnel, information flow, laboratory infrastructure, and unclear responsibilities".

The bovine spongiform encephalitis outbreak in recent UK history showed that there is much scope for greater collaboration between public health services and veterinary agencies.

Comparisons with the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) are likely. The USA has witnessed a strengthening of its public health structures as a consequence of the international bioterrorist threat, but would the UK be able to match its intensity of activity?
